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Abstract
In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to
most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair
behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take
account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker’s
cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and
heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find
a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior
across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is
a general human trait.
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1 Introduction
A key question in the social sciences is whether it is intuitive to behave in a fair manner or
whether fair behavior requires active self-control. One way to approach this question is to
study how long it takes a person to make a decision when choosing between alternatives
that are more or less fair. Since a decision that relies on intuition is typically made faster
than a decision that relies on deliberation, the response time of a fair decision relative to
a selfish decision provides an important indication of the intuitiveness of fair behavior; if
fair behavior is intuitive, we would expect a fair decision to be made faster than a selfish
decision.
Recently, several experimental studies have used data on subjects’ response time in
economic games to argue that fair behavior is intuitive (Rubinstein, 2004, 2007; Rand
et al., 2012; Lotito et al., 2013; Nielsen et al., 2014). In a series of public goods games,
Rand et al. (2012) and Lotito et al. (2013) find that the contribution to the public good is
decreasing in the participant’s response time. A similar association has been documented
in the ultimatum game where the response time of the proposer is negatively correlated
with the share offered to the responder (Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2012). In line with these
results, studies that exogenously manipulate the participant’s response time show that
people tend to contribute more to the public good under time pressure and less when
they are forced to delay making their decision (Cappelletti et al., 2011; Grimm and
Mengel, 2011; Rand et al., 2012; Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2004).1 The negative association
between response time and fair behavior in these experiments has been interpreted as
showing that fair behavior is intuitive. It has been argued that the reason why fair
behavior is intuitive in social dilemma experiments is that cooperation has proven a
successful strategy in most social interactions outside the lab. This is known as the
Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand et al., 2012; Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2004; Rand and
Peysakhovich, 2004). A few studies have, however, challenged these findings. Tingho¨g
et al. (2013) do not find that time pressure increases public good contributions and
Piovesan and Wengstro¨m (2009) find that faster subjects more often than slower subjects
make egoistic choices in distributive situations.
A key problem with the previous studies on response time and fairness, which could
explain the conflicting results in the literature, is the fact that the overall response time
in such experiments does not only depend on whether the decision is made intuitively. As
illustrated in Figure 1, people can be seen as going through three phases when making
a decision in an economic experiment. First, they have to read and understand the
decision problem, then they have to make their decision (t2), and, finally, they have to
implement this decision on the computer screen (T ). The response time T will thus
not only depend on whether the decision itself is based on intuition or deliberation, but
1See also Rand et al. (forthcoming) for a meta-study.
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also on the subject’s cognitive ability and swiftness in implementing their decision. This
introduces an important potential confound when a short response time is interpreted
as indicating intuitive decision-making, since the short response time could also reflect
that the participant easily grasps the decision problem (t1) or is fast in implementing the
decision (T  t2). Hence, a negative association between the participant’s response time
(T ) and the fairness of his or her behavior does not necessarily reflect that there is a
negative association between decision time (t1-t2) and fair behavior; it might only reflect
that there is a negative association between cognitive ability, swiftness, and the weight
attached to fairness.
Figure 1: The components of response time1 Introduction
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Empirical research has consistently documented that humans are vastly different in
how generously they treat each other. In the experimental literature, for instance, hun-
dreds of Dictator Game experiments have shown that a majority of people in that social
context appear to be willing to voluntarily share a positive amount of money with a
stranger.1 However, little is known about how other-regarding preferences are shaped
and where the heterogeneity in them originates from.
A few studies have investigated the intergenerational transmission of these preferences.
Wilhelm et al. (2008) compared charitable giving in the United States of parents and
their offspring and found a high degree of intergenerational dependency in giving to
religious causes, but a less significant correlation in giving to other causes. This is in line
with Bisin and Verdier (2000) who observed that smaller ethnic or religious minorities
tend to invest more in transmitting their attitudes to future generations than larger
minorities or majorities do, because the smaller minorities arguably worry more about the
survival of these attitudes. Also, Okumura and Usui (forthcoming) used American survey
data to find that children of sociable parents appear to be more sociable themselves. A
natural question to ask is then whether such transmission of attitudes and behavior is
caused by nature or nurture. In a Swedish twin-study, Cesarini et al. (2009) compared
Dictator Game choices (as well as risky choices) made by each of two twins and found that
choices made by monozygotic twins are more correlated than those made by same-gender
dizygotic twins. They concluded that 20% of the variation in Dictator Game choices
can be explained genetically, i.e. by nature. It has also been found that other types of
preferences and behavior in social interactions such as political orientation and voting
1In a meta-study of Dictator Game experiments, Engel (2011) used 20,813 observations from 328
treatments to find that about one third (36%) of subjects selfishly keep as much to themselves as
possible, while 64% reveal a willingness to share a positive amount with another individual. Further, it
has been documented that giving in the Dictator Game is positively correlated with generous behavior
outside the lab (e.g. Benz and Meier, 2008; Franzen and Pointner, 2013).
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Note: The figure illustrates the three phases constituting a participant’s response time.
In the present paper, we employ an experimental design with two features that allow us
to more clearly identify the association between decision ti e and fair b havior. The first
feature is that we focus on the dictator game.2 The advantage of the standard dictator
game is that it requires little cognitive effort to understand the game. In particular,
it is easy to identify the most selfish alternative as well as the most fair alternative.
Thus, the time it takes to understand the decision task (t1) is minimized, which reduces
the potential confound created by eterogeneity in cognitive ability. In contrast, the
instructions for a public good game are clearly more demanding and it is also non-trivial
to identify the selfish and the fair alternative in this game. In the ultimatum game, most
people easily identify the fair alternative as a 50-50 split, but it is inherently difficult to
identify the selfish alternative since it depends on the participant’s belief about how the
other participant will respond. The second crucial feature of our design is that we collect
independent measu s of each par icipant’s swiftness and cognitive ability. This e ables
us to control for any remaining confound created by heterogeneity in subject’s swiftness
and cognitive ability.
Our experiment was carried out with a large and heterogenous sample of the Danish
adult population recruited with the assistance of Statistics Denmark. This means that the
p rticipants in this experiment are much more diverse tha a typical sample of college
undergraduates. The collaboration with Statistics Denmark also allows us to match
2Two previous studies of response time and fair behavior have employed the dictator game, but these
conducted either a non-incentivized experiment (Rubinstein, 2004) or a non-standard dictator game
with a fairly complex decision problem (Piovesan and Wengstro¨m, 2009).
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experimental data with data from the Danish population registers. This enables us to
study whether there are systematic differences in the population with respect to what
they find intuitive when making a distributional choice.
Our first main result, reported in Figure 2, is that there is indeed a close association
between fair behavior and response time. The average response time among the selfish
participants (i.e. those who shared nothing with the other participant) was 48.5 seconds,
whereas it was only 38.4 seconds among the fair (i.e. those who split 50-50). We find
considerable heterogeneity in both swiftness and cognitive ability among the participants
in the experiment. In fact, we find that the observed variance in swiftness is as large as
the observed variance in response time, and the differences in cognitive ability are also
striking. The association between response time and fair behavior is, however, robust to
controlling for these and other factors that could affect the subject’s response time. We
thus provide clean evidence of fairness being intuitive. Our second main result is that the
association between fair behavior and short response time holds across groups in society
when differentiating by age, gender, and length of education. Taken together, our two
main results provide compelling evidence suggesting that the predisposition to act fairly
is a general human trait.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the experimental design
and the sample. Section 3 reports the results, while Section 4 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 The experiment
We here provide an overview of the sample and the experimental design.
2.1 The sample and administrative procedures
The experiment was conducted using the Internet Laboratory for Experimental Eco-
nomics (iLEE) at the University of Copenhagen, which provides an online platform for
running large-scale experiments. The participants were recruited from the general Danish
adult population and were randomly selected for invitation by Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark provided official register data which can be matched with the
experimental data. By using the official register data, we can compare the background
characteristics of our participants with a fully representative group of adults from the
general population in Denmark. We observe from Table 1 that our sample of 1,508
participants is similar to the general population with respect to age, gender, and length
of education.3
31,565 participants took part in the dictator game, but background information is lacking for 57 par-
ticipants. Our main analysis is therefore conducted on the 1,508 participants for which we have both
experimental data and background data. In the Online Appendix, Figure A.4, we show that the asso-
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Figure 2: Average response time of the selfish and the fair
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Note: The figure reports the average response time in seconds (top-coded at 120 seconds)
for participants who shared nothing (the selfish, 25% of the 1,508 participants) or shared
equally (the fair, 52% of the 1,508 participants) with the other participant. Standard
errors are indicated.
Table 1: Sample characteristics
Participants General population
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Age 47.7 14.6 48.7 16.2
Male 0.515 0.500 0.495 0.500
Years of education 13.6 2.37 12.2 2.94
Notes: The table reports age, gender and years for education of the 1,508 participants in
the experiment and for a representative sample of 40,000 individuals in the Danish adult
population aged 18-80 years.
In order to ensure the participants’ anonymity in the experiment, Statistics Denmark
generated a unique and random six-digit id-number for each participant. The invitation
ciation between response time and fairness is robust to the inclusion of the 57 participants for whom
background information is missing.
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letter, which was distributed to the participants by Statistics Denmark, included a URL
to the experiment’s website, and a unique login code which the invitee had to enter on
the website in order to access the experiment. The payments to the participants were
made anonymously via electronic bank transfers to the subjects’ bank accounts.
2.2 The design
The experiment was a standard one-shot dictator game with an endowment of 150 DKK
(approximately 27 USD). Participants were matched in pairs and one of the participants,
the dictator, was asked to decide how to split the money with the other participant, the
receiver. The dictator could choose between 11 different amounts to give to the other
participant: 0 DKK, 15 DKK,...., 75 DKK,..., 135 DKK, 150 DKK. Due to the simplicity
of the experiment, it was not cognitively demanding to identify to identify the selfish
alternative and the fair alternative. Each participant was involved in two situations,
one as a dictator and one as a receiver, and was matched with a different participant in
each situation.4 After the experiment, one of the two situations was randomly drawn to
determine payments to the participants.
In line with the existing literature, we measure the response time, T in Figure 1, as
the time elapsed from opening the experiment’s decision screen until closing it again by
submitting a decision on the screen. A participant’s response time, however, is likely
to be affected by a wide range of personal characteristics unrelated to the participant’s
economic decision. In particular, a participant’s cognitive ability and swiftness would
affect the time used to read and understand the instructions as well as the time used to
implement the decision. We therefore collect information that allows us to control for
these factors.
We measure the participant’s swiftness as his or her response time on a screen with
three background questions about age, gender, and educational attainment. Since these
questions are easy to understand and require no deliberation, we view the response time
on this screen as an inverse measure of the participant’s swiftness (i.e. a short response
time means a high degree of swiftness). We also measure the participant’s cognitive
ability using a 20-item progressive matrices test (Beauducel et al., 2010) which is a
general intelligence test measuring the participant’s ability to think logically in unfamiliar
situations.
The cumulative distributions of swiftness and cognitive ability are provided in Fig-
ure 3. We observe from Panel A that there is a striking heterogeneity in the participants’
swiftness; the fastest participants spent less than 20 seconds on answering the background
questions, while the median response time is close to 40 seconds. As shown in Panel B,
there is also considerable heterogeneity with respect to cognitive ability, with the average
4The translated instructions to the experiment are provided in the Online Appendix, Section A.1.
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score of 8.77 being close to what is typically observed in samples with a similar age dis-
tribution (Beauducel et al., 2010). Taken together, the two panels in Figure 3 show that
the potential confounds with swiftness and cognitive ability are serious when interpreting
short response time as an indication of intuitive behavior.
Figure 3: Cumulative distributions of swiftness and cognitive ability
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Note: The figure shows the cumulative distribution of swiftness (Panel A) and cognitive
ability (Panel B) in the sample of participants (n = 1,508). Swiftness is measured as
the response time on a three-item questionnaire on age, gender, and level of education.
Cognitive ability is measured as the participant’s score in a 20-item progressive matrices
test (cognitive ability).
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3 Results
Figure 4 provides an overview of the choice frequencies and median response time of the
different alternatives in the choice set.5 The average share given to the receiver was 0.34,
which is somewhat higher than what is typically found in dictator game experiments with
student samples (Engel, 2011). We observe that the majority of the participants chose
either the selfish alternative (the selfish participants, 25%) or the fair alternative (the fair
participants, 52%). The median response time among the selfish was 37 seconds, whereas
it was only 29 seconds among the fair.6 The median response time among the 23% of
subjects who chose neither the selfish nor the fair alternative (the trade-off participants)
was 39 seconds.
Figure 4: Choice frequencies and median response time
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Note: The figure shows the median response time for each alternative in the choice set
for the 1,508 participants. The circle sizes have been weighted by the choice frequencies.
Our main focus is on whether the intuitive response to distributive behavior is to
5We did not enforce time restrictions in our experiment. This means that the distribution of response
time in the experiment is heavily skewed to the right. Since more than 90% of the subjects submitted
their decision within two minutes, however, we top-code the response time at 120 seconds. In the Online
Appendix, Section A.2, we show that our results are robust to top-coding at 60 or 240 seconds.
6The median response times are lower than the average response times because the distribution of
response time is skewed to the right.
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behave selfishly or fairly, and we thus start by comparing the response time of the two
groups. In Figure 5 we report the cumulative distributions of response time of the selfish
and the fair participants. We observe that the cumulative distribution of the fair partic-
ipants strictly dominates the cumulative distribution of the selfish participants, and we
can clearly reject that the two distributions are the same (Mann-Whitney test, p   0.001).
Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of response time
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Note: The figure shows the cumulative distribution of the response time in seconds for
the selfish (25% of the 1,508 participants) and the fair participants (52% of the 1,508
participants). A selfish participant is defined as someone who gives nothing to the other
participant; a fair participant is defined as someone who gives 50
Table 2, column (1), reports the corresponding OLS regression, where we again ob-
serve that the fair participants have significantly shorter response time than the selfish
participants (p   0.001).7 In columns (2)-(5), we include different background variables
as controls. From column (5) we observe that the association between fairness and re-
sponse time holds when all controls are included. The estimated coefficient for being fair
implies that the average response time of the fair participants is 0.45 standard deviations
lower than the average response time of the selfish participants. From column (5), we also
observe that swifter participants respond significantly faster. This association highlights
the danger of interpreting a short response time (T in Figure 1) as a short decision time
(t2t1 in Figure 1). When including all controls we do not find any significant association
between response time and cognitive ability. Finally, we find that older people tend to
have a longer response time than younger people, while we do not find any association
between response time and gender or education.
Participants who chose neither the fair nor the selfish alternative were engaged in
7In the Online Appendix, Section A.2, we show that the results also hold for Tobit regressions.
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Table 2: Regressions of response time, selfish and fair participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fair 0.316 0.412 0.377 0.437 0.450
p0.059q p0.056q p0.059q p0.060q p0.058q
Swiftness 0.012 0.010
p0.001q p0.001q
Intelligence 0.050 0.014
p0.009q p0.009q
Age 0.016 0.005
p0.002q p0.002q
Male 0.016 0.000
p0.054q p0.052q
Education 0.019 0.003
p0.011q p0.011q
Constant 1.522 2.441 2.009 1.126 2.212
p0.049q p0.086q p0.099q p0.183q p0.222q
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154
R2 0.024 0.142 0.050 0.078 0.149
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the response time (top-coded at 120
seconds) divided by the standard deviation of the response time (31.0 seconds). Standard
errors in parentheses. We have only included the selfish and the fair participants (1,154
participants). “Fair” is a dummy for giving half of the money to the other participant,
“Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds minus the time used (top-coded at 120 seconds)
to answer a three-item questionnaire about age, gender, and educational attainment,
“Cognitive ability” is the number of correct answers in a 20-item progressive matrices
test, “Age” is the participant’s age in years, “Male” is a dummy for the participant being
a male, and “Education” is the length of the participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
an active trade-off between fairness and self-interest. From Table 3, column (1) we find
that there is no significant association between response time and the share given for this
group. This finding is robust to the inclusion of the full set of controls in column (5).
We also observe that the estimated effect of cognitive ability is highly significant for the
trade-off group; the estimated difference between the response time of the participants
in the bottom and top 10% of the cognitive ability distribution is more than 60 seconds.
We interpret this result as showing that those who engage in an active trade-off between
fairness and self-interest rely on deliberation and not on intuition when they make their
decision. The estimated effect of swiftness is, however, in line with what we observe in
Table 2, which is as expected since swiftness would primarily affect the implementation
of the decision.
The fair participants also have a shorter response time than the trade-off participants
(p   0.001).8 Thus, overall, our analysis provides evidence of fair behavior being intuitive
8A OLS regression of response time for all participant is included in the Appendix.
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Table 3: Regressions of response time, trade-off participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share given 0.458 0.270 0.366 0.381 0.273
p0.331q p0.305q p0.315q p0.324q p0.298q
Swiftness 0.015 0.013
p0.002q p0.002q
Cognitive ability 0.096 0.063
p0.016q p0.016q
Age 0.017 0.001
p0.004q p0.004q
Male 0.135 0.077
p0.107q p0.099q
Education 0.024 0.050
p0.023q p0.022q
Constant 1.751 2.810 2.529 0.702 2.510
p0.125q p0.175q p0.174q p0.366q p0.411q
Observations 354 354 354 354 354
R2 0.005 0.161 0.101 0.066 0.215
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the response time (top-coded at 120
seconds) divided by the standard deviation of the response time (31.0 seconds). Standard
errors in parentheses. We have only included participants who chose neither the selfish
nor the fair alternative (354 participants). “Share given” is the share of the money given
to the other participant, “Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds minus the time used
(top-coded at 120 seconds) to answer a three-item questionnaire about age, gender, and
educational attainment, “Cognitive ability” is the number of correct answers in a 20-item
progressive matrices test, “Age” is the participant’s age in years, “Male” is a dummy for
the participant being a male, and “Education” is the length of the participant’s education
in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
and requiring a short decision-time, whereas any deviation from fair behavior seems to
trigger deliberation and a longer decision-time.
3.1 Heterogenous effects
We now turn to the question of whether there are systematic differences across society
with respect to how people intuitively respond to a distributive problem. We address
this question by examining how the association between fair behavior and response time
interacts with the participant’s characteristics.
In Table 4, we report OLS regressions of response time on interaction effects for those
participants who chose either the selfish or the fair alternative. We observe no significant
interaction effect between the fair behavior and swiftness or between fair behavior and
cognitive ability. We also observe that the association between fair behavior and response
time is strikingly similar for participants of different age, gender, and educational attain-
11
ment. Taken together, these results show that the intuitive response to the dictator game
is the same across society which suggests that fair behavior being intuitive is a general
human trait.
4 Concluding remarks
We find that participants in a large and heterogenous sample use significantly less time
to make a decision in the dictator game when they act fairly than when they act self-
ishly. This is robust to controlling for a rich set of background information about the
participants, including independent measures of their swiftness and cognitive ability.
Our analysis sheds light on the conflicting results observed in the previous literature.
We find significant heterogeneity in swiftness and cognitive ability among the participants,
and we show that these characteristics matter when explaining response time. We argue
that this, at least partly, reflects that response time consists of more than decision time;
it also captures the time spent on reading and understanding the instructions as well as
the time spent on implementing the decision. None of the previous studies on response
time and fair behavior controlled for these personal characteristics, which means that
the mixed results may reflect confounds related to associations between cognitive ability,
swiftness, and the importance attached to fair behavior. Further, it follows from our
analysis that an exogenous manipulation of response time does not necessarily map into
an exogenous manipulation of decision time (Rand et al., 2012; Tingho¨g et al., 2013),
it may as well affect the other components of response time, and thus does not cleanly
identify the effect of increased reliance on intuitive behavior.
We also find a striking similarity in the relationship between fair behavior and response
time in the Danish society across gender, age groups, and educational attainment. Taken
together our results provide compelling evidence suggesting that the predisposition to act
fairly is a general human trait.
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Abstract
Section A.1 presents our experimental instructions translated into English. Sec-
tion A.2 provides robustness checks of the results presented in the paper.
A.1 Instructions
In this section, we present translated instructions from the experiment. The instructions
were originally written in Danish. Subjects were able to review the instructions on later
screens by clicking the respective button on the screen.
[Screen 1: Instructions for part 1]
Instructions for the experiment’s first part
All participants in the experiment initially receive 75 DKK.
You are now involved in 2 decision situations.
In each situation, you will be randomly matched with another participant. (It will not
be the same participant.)
Your decision
In one situation, you are the decision maker. You must decide how you wish to
divide the total amount that you and the other participant have been given
(75 + 75 = 150 DKK) between the two of you.
The initial situation is shown below.
[Continue]
[Screen 2: Instructions for part 2]
The other situation
In the other situation, he or she is the decision maker. He or she must make
a similar decision about how he or she wants to divide the total amount that you have
initially been given.
1
Figure A.1: Illustration explaining the initial situation in the Dictator Game
Translated text: “Udgangspunkt”=Initial situation. “Dig”=You. “Den anden”=The
other one.
Outcome
Only one of the situations will be selected for payments. Both you and that other par-
ticipant will be paid according to the decision made in that situation. It is equally likely
that you will be paid according to the situation in which you are the decision maker as
it is that you will be paid according to the situation in which the other participant is the
decision maker.
[Go back] [Continue]
[Screen 3: Decision screen]
Your decision
Pick one of the options below and click Submit decision.
[See the instructions again] [Submit decision]
2
Figure A.2: Screenshot of the decision screen in the Dictator Game
Translated text: “Fordeling (dig - den anden)”=Division (you - the other). “Du f˚ar”=You
get. “Den anden f˚ar”=The other gets. “Din beslutning”=Your decision
3
Figure A.3: Screenshot of the decision screen in the Dictator Game after clicking 80-20
Translated text: “Fordeling (dig - den anden)”=Division (you - the other). “Du f˚ar”=You
get. “Den anden f˚ar”=The other gets. “Din beslutning”=Your decision. “3. mu-
lighed”=3rd option. “Dig”=You. “Den anden”=The other one.
4
A.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we provide robustness checks of the results presented in the main paper.
We make the following robustness checks:
Figure A.4: Figure 2 in the main paper, but with participants about whom we do not
have background information included, too.
Table A.1: Regressions from Table 2 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 60
seconds.
Table A.2: Regressions from Table 2 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 240
seconds.
Table A.3: Regressions from Table 2 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 120
seconds and Tobit regression methods.
Table A.4: Regressions from Table 3 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 60
seconds.
Table A.5: Regressions from Table 3 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 240
seconds.
Table A.6: Regressions from Table 3 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 120
seconds and Tobit regression methods.
Table A.7: Regressions from Table 4 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 60
seconds.
Table A.8: Regressions from Table 4 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 240
seconds.
Table A.9: Regressions from Table 4 in the main paper, but with top-coding at 120
seconds and Tobit regression methods.
For Tables A.1, A.4, and A.7 we note that the mean response time when top-coding
at 60 seconds was 36.2 seconds (σ  16.9). Likewise, for Tables A.2, A.5, and A.8 we note
that the mean response time when top-coding at 240 seconds was 48.1 seconds (σ  44.7).
Tables A.3, A.6, and A.9 use the actual response time as the dependent variable, and not
the normalized response time used in the main paper and in the other tables presented
in this Appendix.
In Table A.10, we compare the response time of fair participants to all the others’
response time, i.e. both the selfish participants and the trade-off participants. Similar to
what was found in Table 2 in the main paper, we find that the average response time of
the fair participants is 0.45 standard deviations lower than the average response time of
the other participants.
5
Figure A.4: Average response time of the selfish and the fair
0
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Note: The figure reports the average response time in seconds (top-coded at 120 seconds)
for participants who shared nothing (selfish) or shared equally (fair) with the other par-
ticipant. Standard errors are indicated. We have included all 1,565 participants’ choices
and response times for this figure. 25% of these shared nothing, while 52% shared half.
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Table A.1: Regressions of response time, selfish and fair participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fair -0.336 -0.445 -0.413 -0.482 -0.499
(0.062) (0.058) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060)
Swiftness -0.013 -0.011
(0.001) (0.001)
Cognitive ability -0.063 -0.021
(0.009) (0.010)
Age 0.019 0.006
(0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.014 0.004
(0.056) (0.054)
Education -0.026 -0.002
(0.012) (0.012)
Constant 2.272 3.298 2.880 1.848 3.081
(0.051) (0.089) (0.103) (0.190) (0.230)
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154
R2 0.025 0.159 0.062 0.095 0.172
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the response time top-coded at 60
seconds divided by the standard deviation of the response time (31.0 seconds). Standard
errors in parentheses. We have only included the selfish and the fair participants (1,154
participants). “Fair” is a dummy for giving half of the money sum to the other participant,
“Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds minus the time used (top-coded at 120 seconds)
on answering a three-item questionnaire about age, gender, and educational attainment,
“Cognitive ability” is the number of correct answers on a 20-item progressive matrices
test, “Age” is the participant’s age, “Male” is a dummy for the participant being a male,
and “Education” is the length of the participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
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Table A.2: Regressions of response time, selfish and fair participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fair -0.245 -0.324 -0.292 -0.337 -0.347
(0.055) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055)
Swiftness -0.010 -0.009
(0.001) (0.001)
Cognitive ability -0.038 -0.010
(0.008) (0.009)
Age 0.012 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.032 -0.019
(0.051) (0.050)
Education -0.013 0.006
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant 1.098 1.845 1.470 0.785 1.691
(0.045) (0.082) (0.093) (0.173) (0.212)
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154
R2 0.017 0.107 0.034 0.051 0.110
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the response time top-coded at 240
seconds divided by the standard deviation of the response time (31.0 seconds). Standard
errors in parentheses. We have only included the selfish and the fair participants (1,154
participants). “Fair” is a dummy for giving half of the money sum to the other participant,
“Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds minus the time used (top-coded at 120 seconds)
on answering a three-item questionnaire about age, gender, and educational attainment,
“Cognitive ability” is the number of correct answers on a 20-item progressive matrices
test, “Age” is the participant’s age, “Male” is a dummy for the participant being a male,
and “Education” is the length of the participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
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Table A.3: Regressions of response time, selfish and fair participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fair -10.49 -13.67 -12.50 -14.54 -14.90
(2.00) (1.89) (2.00) (2.01) (1.94)
Swiftness -0.39 -0.34
(0.03) (0.04)
Cognitive ability -1.66 -0.45
(0.30) (0.31)
Age 0.52 0.16
(0.07) (0.07)
Male -0.74 -0.20
(1.83) (1.76)
Education -0.61 0.13
(0.38) (0.38)
Constant 49.40 79.96 65.46 35.94 72.03
(1.64) (2.91) (3.35) (6.16) (7.48)
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154
Notes: Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the response time in seconds top-
coded at 120 seconds. Standard errors in parentheses. We have only included the selfish
and the fair participants (1,154 participants). “Fair” is a dummy for giving half of the
money sum to the other participant, “Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds minus the
time used (top-coded at 120 seconds) on answering a three-item questionnaire about
age, gender, and educational attainment, “Cognitive ability” is the number of correct
answers on a 20-item progressive matrices test, “Age” is the participant’s age, “Male”
is a dummy for the participant being a male, and “Education” is the length of the
participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
9
Table A.4: Regressions of response time, trade-off participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share given -0.179 0.003 -0.100 -0.056 0.033
(0.306) (0.280) (0.294) (0.296) (0.276)
Swiftness -0.015 -0.012
(0.002) (0.002)
Cognitive ability -0.083 -0.044
(0.015) (0.015)
Age 0.018 0.006
(0.003) (0.004)
Male -0.091 -0.037
(0.098) (0.092)
Education -0.012 0.011
(0.021) (0.020)
Constant 2.452 3.477 3.123 1.766 3.232
(0.116) (0.160) (0.163) (0.334) (0.381)
Observations 354 354 354 354 354
R2 0.001 0.172 0.085 0.086 0.209
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the response time top-coded at 60
seconds divided by the standard deviation of the response time (31.0 seconds). Standard
errors in parentheses. We have only included participants who did not choose either
the selfish or the fair alternative (354 participants). “Share given” is the share of the
endowment given to the other participant, “Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds minus
the time used (top-coded at 120 seconds) on answering a three-item questionnaire about
age, gender, and educational attainment, “Cognitive ability” is the number of correct
answers on a 20-item progressive matrices test, “Age” is the participant’s age, “Male”
is a dummy for the participant being a male, and “Education” is the length of the
participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
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Table A.5: Regressions of response time, trade-off participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share given -0.435 -0.261 -0.345 -0.390 -0.282
(0.326) (0.304) (0.311) (0.322) (0.295)
Swiftness -0.014 -0.013
(0.002) (0.002)
Cognitive ability -0.095 -0.070
(0.015) (0.016)
Age 0.013 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.129 -0.075
(0.107) (0.099)
Education 0.036 0.061
(0.023) (0.021)
Constant 1.309 2.290 2.077 0.271 2.136
(0.124) (0.174) (0.172) (0.364) (0.407)
Observations 354 354 354 354 354
R2 0.005 0.143 0.101 0.048 0.207
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the response time top-coded at 240
seconds divided by the standard deviation of the response time (31.0 seconds). Standard
errors in parentheses. We have only included participants who did not choose either
the selfish or the fair alternative (354 participants). “Share given” is the share of the
endowment given to the other participant, “Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds minus
the time used (top-coded at 120 seconds) on answering a three-item questionnaire about
age, gender, and educational attainment, “Cognitive ability” is the number of correct
answers on a 20-item progressive matrices test, “Age” is the participant’s age, “Male”
is a dummy for the participant being a male, and “Education” is the length of the
participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
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Table A.6: Regressions of response time, trade-off participants only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share given -15.68 -9.13 -12.54 -13.17 -9.28
(11.44) (10.52) (10.88) (11.15) (10.21)
Swiftness -0.52 -0.46
(0.07) (0.07)
Cognitive ability -3.35 -2.24
(0.55) (0.56)
Age 0.56 0.03
(0.12) (0.13)
Male -4.89 -2.87
(3.71) (3.42)
Education 0.90 1.81
(0.80) (0.74)
Constant 57.30 94.22 84.43 20.81 84.59
(4.34) (6.11) (6.07) (12.61) (14.14)
Observations 354 354 354 354 354
Notes: Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the response time in seconds top-
coded at 120 seconds. Standard errors in parentheses. We have only included partic-
ipants who did not choose either the selfish or the fair alternative (354 participants).
“Share given” is the share of the endowment given to the other participant, “Swiftness”
is measured as 120 seconds minus the time used (top-coded at 120 seconds) on answering
a three-item questionnaire about age, gender, and educational attainment, “Cognitive
ability” is the number of correct answers on a 20-item progressive matrices test, “Age”
is the participant’s age, “Male” is a dummy for the participant being a male, and “Edu-
cation” is the length of the participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
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Table A.10: Regressions of response time, all participants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fair -0.350 -0.428 -0.388 -0.439 -0.454
(0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047)
Swiftness -0.012 -0.011
(0.001) (0.001)
Cognitive ability -0.062 -0.027
(0.008) (0.008)
Age 0.016 0.004
(0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.039 -0.011
(0.048) (0.046)
Education -0.011 0.014
(0.010) (0.010)
Constant 1.558 2.511 2.123 1.020 2.291
(0.036) (0.072) (0.078) (0.160) (0.192)
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508
R2 0.032 0.158 0.072 0.086 0.171
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the response time (top-coded at 120
seconds) divided by the standard deviation of the response time (31.0 seconds). Standard
errors in parentheses. We have included all the 1,508 participants. “Fair” is a dummy for
giving half of the money to the other participant, “Swiftness” is measured as 120 seconds
minus the time used (top-coded at 120 seconds) on answering a three-item questionnaire
about age, gender, and educational attainment, “Cognitive ability” is the number of
correct answers on a 20-item progressive matrices test, “Age” is the participant’s age in
years, “Male” is a dummy for the participant being a male, and “Education” is the length
of the participant’s education in years.
 p   0.05,  p   0.01,  p   0.001
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